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The Narrative Imagination across Media 
I want to argue against the strong presumption that narrative, capable as it is of 
expression in several different media, is constituted by a medium-independent content: I 
propose to interrogate the role of the medium in narrative, as vehicle of transmission or 
means of articulation, and unpack the relation between narrative media and the 
foundational narrative concept of the event, which figures (misleadingly) in most 
definitions of minimal narrative, in order to arrive at a view of narrative as a cognitive 
faculty. This approach to narrative facilitates a rhetorical model of its medium-
contingency, in which a narrative medium is any semiotic means that enables the 
articulation (as distinct from expression) of cognitive image schemata in narrative form. 
Integral to this position is an emphasis upon the self-reflexiveness of the narrative 
imagination in process, of which I take dreaming to be a paradigm case. 
In elaborating this view, I shall focus upon the comics page reproduced in figure one, 
which comes from Sandman volume two, 7KH'ROO¶V+RXVH. My choice of example is 
influenced by the thematic importance of the narrative imagination throughout the 
Sandman series, notably in relation to the figures of Orpheus and Shakespeare, and in 
particular the emphasis upon dreaming as an instance of the narrative imagination (the 
Sandman himself, Morpheus, is Lord of the Dreaming; and much of the narrative 
advances through or in reaction to the dreams and nightmares of the characters). 
Represented in figure one are the dreams of a lesbian couple named Chantal and Zelda, 
residents of the boarding house to which the title of the volume partly refers: the page 
FRQWDLQVWZRSDUDOOHOQDUUDWLYHVWUDQGV&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPUXQQLQJDFURVVWKH top and 
=HOGD¶VDORQJWKHERWWRPERWKDQFKRUHGE\WKHFHQWUDOLPDJHRIWKHVOHHSLQJFRXSOH
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Figure one 
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Before I address the detail of these dream narratives, however, I want to raise a 
preliminary question about the nature of narrative articulation in sequential art. Consider 
the relation between two adjacent comics frames, where these delineate a simple event: 
for example, the lifting of the veil, at the bottom right of the page. Here we have two 
consecutive images of the same figure, the first with the veil lowered, the second with it 
UDLVHGWRUHYHDODVSLGHU¶VKHDG7KHVSLGHUDQGLQGHHGWKHYHLODUHHOHPHQWVRIWKH
FRXSOH¶VJRWKLFSUHRFFXSDWLRQVWKH\DUHNQRZQLQWKHERDUGLQJ house as the spider 
ZRPHQDQGFODLPWRKDYH³WKHODUJHVWFROOHFWLRQRIVWXIIHGspiders in private hands on 
WKH(DVWHUQ6HDERDUG´7KHVHDVVRFLDWLRQVKHOSWRH[SODLQZK\=HOGD¶VUHVSRQVHDW
this point in her dream is not the reaction of horror we might have expected. My 
immediate concern, however, is how such a sequence of images works in narrative terms. 
If you were to explain how we comprehend this sequence you might say, with Umberto 
(FR³REYLRXVO\WKHUHDGHUZHOGVWKHVHSDUWVWRJHWKHULQKLVLPDJLQDWLRQDQGWKHQ
SHUFHLYHVWKHPDVDFRQWLQXRXVIORZ´%XWLVWKLVREYLRXV"It may to an extent be 
possible to do so, in the same sense that it is possible to use a fiction as the basis for 
imagining a fictional world, though there is considerable scope for doing so in different 
ways (in this case, is the movement slow and ceremonial, or abrupt and dramatic?). 
However, I want to argue that such a process is in no way inherent in reading such a 
sequence, and furthermore that in terms of narrative comprehension it would in fact be a 
retrograde move. This claim has large implications for our understanding of the role of 
media in narrative representation. 
&RQVLGHUWKHZD\(FR¶VFRPPHQWUHSUHVHQWVZKDWKDSSHQVLQWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRID
comics sequence such as our veil example. It is conceived as a two-stage process, an 
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imaginative welding followed by perceiving, by means of which the reader works back 
through the transformations of the creative process and arrives at a virtual experience of 
the originary stream of sense data that it is supposed to mediate. The assumed end point 
of the prRFHVVWKDWSHUFHSWLRQRI³DFRQWLQXRXVIORZ´LVWKHIRFXVRIP\REMHFWLRQ$Q
undifferentiated flux of sense impressions may indeed constitute the raw material of 
experience, but as undifferentiated flux it is meaningless: only the cognitive exercise of 
representation makes sense of it, by articulating it²among other things, demarcating it 
into events. The lifting of the veil is articulated as an event, an act of revelation, by these 
two images, the two frames of the sequence. If we were really to respond to this sequence 
by subsuming it within a continuous flow, we would strip it of its status and meaning as 
an event. Event status, and narrative tellability, is not intrinsic in the temporal world, but 
evaluative, and always relative to some interpretative or communicative context. I have 
argued elsewhere that events cannot be considered as the elemental units of narrative, 
since they are always only constituted as such in the process of narration. Definitions of 
minimal narrative are routinely formulated in terms of the representation of one or more 
events: narrative is either located within the (durational) event, in the transformation from 
before to after; or it is located between (punctual) events, in the passage from one to the 
next.1 But the mutual presupposition of these two senses of event leaves the nature of 
narrative, which either continues to lurk within, or slips between, entirely unexplained. 
The notion of event is a narrative product, and its unity as event is contingent upon the 
signifying units of the medium of narration.2 7KHUHLVDKLQWLQ(FR¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIDQ
analogy with film viewing, in which there is indeed a pre-cognitive perceptual flow from 
frame to frame: but this is a conceptual transposition to another medium with rather 
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different means of representation and narrative articulation. It should not obscure the 
point, precisely because it is a shift to another medium, not a reading through the 
medium. In the realm of narrative comprehension, there is always another medium, 
because without media there is no representation: this is as true inside the head as it is on 
the page or screen. 
The relation between frames is also discussed by Scott McCloud, who is quite clear 
about the differences between its operation in comics and in film. Here too, though, the 
point that concerns me is, at best, obscured. McCloud explains how we bridge the gutter 
between frames in terms of closure, a concept that would work very well if he meant it in 
the narrative sense, which is congruent with the demarcation of events. His usage, 
KRZHYHUGUDZVXSRQWKHLGHDRIYLVXDOFORVXUH³REVHUYLQJWKHSDUWVEXWSHUFHLYLQJWKH
ZKROH´ZKLFKPDNHVLWYHU\SURQHWRDFRQIODWLRQEHWZHHQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDQGWKHLU
REMHFWV6RZKLOHKHVD\VWKDW³LQWKHOLPERRIWKHJXtter, human imagination takes two 
VHSDUDWHLPDJHVDQGWUDQVIRUPVWKHPLQWRDVLQJOHLGHD´DIRUPXODWLRQ,ZRXOG
KDSSLO\DFFHSWKHDOVRVD\VWKDW³FORVXUHDOORZVXVWRFRQQHFWWKHVHPRPHQWVDQG
PHQWDOO\FRQVWUXFWDFRQWLQXRXVXQLILHGUHDOLW\´DQG³FORVXUHLVFRPLFV¶SULPDU\
PHDQVRIVLPXODWLQJWLPHDQGPRWLRQ´7KHVHDUHVWDWHPHQWV,ZDQWWRUHVLVWEHFDXVH
WKH\HPERG\WKHEDVLFDVVXPSWLRQWKDW,¶PFRQWHVWLQJWKDWLVWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDW
narrative representation works simply as a reproduction, or simulation, of reality, 
WHPSRUDOLW\DQGIOX[)OX[LVZKDWZHHQFRXQWHULQWKHZRUOGDQGWKHUH¶VDOUHDG\SOHQW\
of it to keep us busy. Representation is one of the ways in which we busy ourselves, an 
encoding process of cognitive mapping which, as such, is semiotic: its power is that of 
assimilation, primarily by reducing the chaos of sense data to comprehensible terms. 
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Representation always functions within some system of signs, the interpretants of which 
are not the real, but other signs. This pursuit of signs is a function of cognitive 
processing, and it could not lead beyond that frame of reference without ceasing to 
signify, at which point it would also cease to have any pragmatic value as a means of 
understanding. The efficacy of representation depends upon the fact that it begins and 
ends in the mind: its baseline is not the real but the percept, which is itself a 
representation, and only functional as significant within the articulated system of 
perception. Narrative representation has its roots here, in the articulation of change: it 
delimits the mutability of matter in time, producing event, cause and effect, agent and 
purpose. 
I shall return to the specifics of the comics medium, and of my Sandman example, in a 
moment; but in order to draw out the implication of my argument for our understanding 
of narrative media in general, it helps to step back from the various notions of a medium 
in general usage. These tend to compound several overlapping senses, which have been 
helpfully teased apart by Marie-Laure Ryan: she draws a basic distinction between 
WUDQVPLVVLYHDQGVHPLRWLFFRQFHSWVRIDPHGLXPDVD³FKDQQHORIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´RUD
³PDWHULDOPHDQVRIH[SUHVVLRQ´5\DQDUJXHVWKDWQHLWKHUFDWHJRU\DORQHFDQ\LHOGDQ
adequate definition of medium: transmissive senses represent media as the technological 
conduits of essentially autonomous meanings; while semiotic senses do not provide for 
the conceptual separation of medium and message that is necessary if we are to 
understand narrative as a structure independent of any medium, and transposable between 
media (17). However, the view I am advancing contradicts this second argument: there is 
no conceptual level of narrative between the formlessness of mind-external data and the 
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semiotic framework of representation, in which some medium is inherent, whether 
mental or technological. Narrative ideation is itself medium bound, in the perceptual and 
conceptual apparatus of mental representation. In other words, My argument implies that 
the semiotic sense of medium does indeed supply a necessary and sufficient definition of 
medium, while the transmissive sense involves a range of more or less contingent, more 
or less technological extensions of the concept. Narrative, on this view, cannot be 
medium-independent: it is always dependent upon representation in some medium, even 
while it is capable of harnessing several. 
The sense in which the category of narrative transcends any particular medium, then, 
is not to be conceived in deep structural terms, by invoking medium-independent notions 
such as fabula, or story grammar: it is a discursive matter²a communicative rhetoric that 
exploits certain representational capabilities that are common to a range of media. The 
only alternatives to this view are that narrative structure can be conceived in the absence 
of representation, or that representation can be conceived in the absence of any medium. 
For narrative structure to be independent of representation, story logic would have to be 
innate in mind-external reality: the world itself already storied. On the other hand, if story 
JUDPPDUVDUHPHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVEXWLQGHSHQGHQWRI³PHGLDOUHDOL]DWLRQ´ZKLFK
ZRXOGEHUHVHUYHGIRUWKHSURFHVVRI³H[WHUQDOL]DWLRQ´-DKQWKLVFRPPLWVXVWRDQ
unjustifiably restULFWHGGHILQLWLRQRI³PHGLXP´$PHGLXPPLQLPDOO\LVDYHKLFOHRI
semiosis, and that is present at the ground level of cognitive processing, in the 
articulation of sense data in the perceptual system. The necessary condition for semiosis, 
here, is articulation, rather than communication in any restrictive sense: semiosis is 
always, even within the mind, a contextually situated and dialogic process.3  
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Perhaps the difficulty here is a legacy of the structuralist analogy between narrative 
and language, which is itself indirectly buttressed in narrative theory by the privileged 
status often accorded to narratives in linguistic media. Ideas of narrative syntax, story 
grammars, and the general baggage of the linguistic analogy tend to contaminate more 
broadly coJQLWLYHWHUPVVXFKDV³VFULSW´DQG³VFKHPD´Schank and Abelson). For my 
purposes, at least, the value of these concepts lies precisely in the extent to which they are 
LUUHGXFLEOHWRDOLQJXLVWLFSDUDGLJPVRLW¶VZRUWKQRWLQJZK\WKDWLVVR6FULSWVDUHQot 
particularized narratives, somewhat as grammars are not sentences; but unlike grammars 
they are not generative, in the sense that they do not define what shall and shall not be a 
ZHOOIRUPHGRU³JUDPPDWLFDO´QDUUDWLYH,QVWHDGVFULSWVDUHKHXULVWLFWheir value lies in 
the extent to which they facilitate the ongoing encounter between mind and temporal 
existence. Any heuristic will do until you encounter something that resists its explanatory 
or predictive power, at which point you have to revise the script. Grammars are medium-
independent abstractions that can be used to characterize the structure of digital semiotic 
systems, such as language, which use discrete signifying units; but narrative is capable of 
articulation in both digital systems and analogical systems such as visual imagery, which 
are graded or scalar. Narrative, then, is not amenable to grammar: scripts and schemata 
are not abstractions but templates, general-purpose representations, which serve as tools 
of the cognitive project of the narrative faculty. The narrative faculty, on this view, is not 
a species of the linguistic faculty, but something quite distinct and in some sense more 
primitive. 
By characterizing narrative as a cognitive faculty, I am seeking to ground my earlier 
account of the articulation of narrative events more solidly upon the foundation of 
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general cognitive processing. The event is a product of narrative processing, an instance 
of cognitive chunking in which the mind negotiates with temporal phenomena. Narrative 
proceVVLQJWKHQLVDPRGHRIDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHGDWDRIH[SHULHQFH³DUWLFXODWLRQ´PXVW
be understood to mean the production of meaning, the creation of structure, rather than 
the expression of some mind-independent content. What matters is this codification, the 
respect in which mental representations differ from their objects rather than merely 
reproduce them, because this is the respect in which they assimilate data. A map you can 
read, however crude or partial, serves human purposes in ways that the illegible terrain 
itself cannot. It goes without saying that the meaning-producing act of articulation is also 
potentially a communicative, or meaning-transmitting act: meaning is inherently part of a 
discursive economy, whether it circulates within the individual mind or between minds. 
In the discussion so far I have silently run together two perspectives upon narrative 
representation that I now want to juxtapose more explicitly. In one perspective, a 
narrative is the object of interpretation; in the other, it is a means of interpretation. These 
DOWHUQDWLYHVDUHZHOOFDSWXUHGLQ'DYLG+HUPDQ¶VLQWURGXFWLRQWRNarrative Theory and 
the Cognitive SciencesZKHUHKHGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ³PDNLQJVHQVHRIVWRULHV´DQG
³VWRULHVDVVHQVH-PDNLQJ´-14). We differ slightly in our interpretation of the second 
FDWHJRU\ZKLFKKHWDNHVWRPHDQVWRULHV³DVWRROVIRUWKLQNLQJ´ZKHUHDV,WDNHLW
PRUHIXQGDPHQWDOO\WRPHDQ³VWRULHVDVVHQVH-PDNLQJSURFHVVHV´7KDWLVWRVD\,ZDQW
to place the emphasis upon the narrative process as a basic, essential human sense-
making activity, rather than upon the narrative product as a tool of sense-making. This 
process is inherently anthropocentric, and indeed anthropomorphic, not because stories 
are about people (though they usually are), but because they are by people: their frame of 
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reference is human experientiality. We are capable of recognising the partiality and 
distortion entailed by this horizon, and we have developed other ways of modelling the 
universe which have greater analytic and predictive powers in many contexts; but there is 
something irreducible about the limitations of narrative sense-making, because those 
VDPHOLPLWDWLRQVDUHLQWHJUDOWRQDUUDWLYH¶VUROHLQWKHSURGXFWLRQRIKXPDQYDOXH7KLV
elemental reciprocity between narrative process and narrative meaning is what I mean to 
FDSWXUHLQWKHZRUG³DUWLFXODWLRQ´ZKLFKPHDQVERWKWKHFUHDWLRQRIVLJQLILFDQWUHODWLRQV
between parts, and the expression of such relations: in narrative, fundamentally, these 
two are the same. This reciprocity can also be seen as the root of a recursiveness that I 
think is innate in narrative understanding generally, and crucial to the fictive use of 
QDUUDWLYH7KHVDPHUHFXUVLYHQHVVLVODWHQWLQ+HUPDQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQPDNLQJVHQVe 
of stories and stories as sense-making: the correlation of these two perspectives expresses 
very well the point that, within the parameters of narrative, making sense of stories is 
making sense of sense-making. That is to say that, both across and within media, 
narrative representations are intelligible in terms of other narrative representations. 
Narrative sense-making always rides piggy back upon prior acts of narrative sense-
making, and at the bottom of this pile is not the solid ground of truth, but only the 
pragmatic efficacy of particular stories for particular purposes in particular contexts. 
The distinctive rhetoric of narrative fictionality can be understood in relation to this 
principle of narrative recursiveness, by way of the rather more accessible phenomenon of 
self-reflexivity. The comics page in figure one is representative of the Sandman series as 
a whole in exhibiting several kinds of self-reflexivity, but I want to make a broad 
distinction between two kinds: the first kind, overt self-consciousness, is a circumstantial 
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(but not unusual) feature of this example, and one of the ways fictionality often advertises 
itself; but the second kind, implicit self-reference, is the more fundamental feature of 
narrative self-reflexivity, and it is the exploitation of implicit self-reference that most 
strongly correlates with the rhetorical stance associated with fictionality. Sandman is 
extremely self-conscious in its relation to the narrative stockpile of several cultures, 
drawing for example upon classical, Norse, African, and eastern mythologies, as well as 
ranging widely over the literary canon; and equally self-conscious in its more specific 
invocation of the history of the comics medium, including stylistic allusions to such 
varied instances as WinsRU0F&D\¶VLittle Nemo in Slumberland, EC horror comics of 
WKH¶ILIWLHVDQGFRQWHPSRUDU\-DSDQHVHPDQJD,WLVDOVRH[WUHPHO\VHOI-aware and 
sophisticated in its use of the semiotic potential of the twin media channels of comics²
image and text²both separately and in counterpoint to each other, and almost every page 
offers evidence of its rhetorical inventiveness in this regard. These features of Sandman 
make it very suggestive as an occasion and means for reflection upon the recursive nature 
of the narrative imagination. 
One aspect of the overt self-consciousness in figure one is an instance of the way 
Sandman constantly indexes the literary and visual heritage of various cultural traditions: 
here we have the allusions to the gothic novel, Melmoth the Wanderer and The Castle of 
Otranto LQSDUWLFXODUDQGWKHHYRFDWLRQRI-RKQ7HQQLHO¶VIDPRXVLOOXVWUDWLRQVIRUAlice 
in Wonderland7KRVHDUHERWKIHDWXUHVRI=HOGD¶VGUHDPDWWKHERWWRPRIWKHSDJH
&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPDWWKHWRSH[KLELWVthe other, formal aspect of overt self-consciousness, 
in which Gaiman exploits the relation between the verbal and visual channels of the 
comics medium. Chantal dreams she is having a relationship with a sentence, and the 
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sentence that tells us so, standing in for her lover-sentence (which we never get to read), 
is an embodiment of that odd elevation of language: the lettering emphasises the 
PDWHULDOLW\RIWKHWH[WDVLQIDFWGRHVWKHFXUVLYHVFULSWLQWKHUHVWRI&KDQWDO¶VGUHDP
though to different ends); and the words form a monumental block filling half the frame, 
balancing the image of Chantal herself in the other half. 
7KHYHUEDOWH[WRI&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPSOD\VZLWKWKHFRQFHLWRIWKHORYHU-sentence, but 
the images are complicating the story, in a way that illustrates my other category of self-
reflexivity, the implicit self-UHIHUHQFHH[SORLWHGE\WKHUKHWRULFRIILFWLRQDOLW\KHUH,¶P
referring to the fictionality of SandmanQRWRI&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPQDUUDWLYH7KLVYLVXDO
counter-narrative begins at the juncture of text and image, with the letter zed, or zee, 
ZKLFKDSSHDUVWREHWKHWLWOHRIWKHERRNLQ&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPLWLVDOVRDV=HOGD¶VGUHDP
UHYHDOVWKHSHWQDPH=HOGD¶VPRWKHUXVHGIRUKHUDQGDFHQWUDOWKHPHRI=HOGD¶VGUHDP
is the structural interchangeability of her mother and Chantal). So it is significant that in 
the second frame Chantal kisses the book, as opposed to the sentence, and that in this 
frame, her head position and her anomalously dishevelled hair closely echo the image 
below, of their actual sleeping position, in which Zelda occupies the position of the 
book.4 These metonymic and metaphoric displacements (sentence to book, book to 
=HOGDLPSO\WKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHVHQWHQFHLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ=HOGD%XW&KDQWDO¶V
explicit dream narrative is pulling away from any such insight, and in the next frame 
begins to re-establish the idealised self-image represented by the full-face pose. The 
tension involved in sustaining the surface narrative finds expression in the negative turn 
of events from this point on, wKLOHWKHGLUHFWJD]HRI&KDQWDO¶VLGHDOVHOI-representation 
prepares us for its fracture into shards in the last frame of the dream: this confirms it as a 
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mirror image²RUSHUKDSVVLQFHWKH³=´LVQRWUHYHUVHGDVWKHLQDFFHVVLEOHVHOIRIZKRP
the dreaming Chantal is herself only a broken reflection. 
This sort of interpretation cannot be supported solely by reference to the notional 
object of representation, the dream itself, because it depends upon transgressions of the 
boundaries between media channels, narrative threads, and non-sequential frames on the 
page. Instead, it is sanctioned by our awareness of self-awareness, which is the substrate 
of fictive rhetoric. The foregrounding of implicit self-reference is characteristic of 
fictionality because it is intrinsic to the priority of discourse over reference in the 
narrative imagination: the fictive process generates narrative in response to 
anthropocentric imperatives (on several levels: instinctual/libidinal, emotional, 
ideological), which are available as values only within a discursive economy; whereas 
non-fictional narrative is generated under the presiding referential imperative of 
accountability to extra-textual sources. This privileging of value over documentary fact is 
not a substantial distinction, but a rhetorical one: all narrative semiosis unfolds in an 
evolving recursive process or feedback loop within the domain of discourse. Non-
ILFWLRQDOQDUUDWLYHKRZHYHULVFKDUDFWHULVHGE\DUKHWRULFDO³GLUHFWLRQRIILW´LQZKLFK
semiosis is always approaching its represented object, only to arrive at another sign; 
whereas fictional narrative semiosis is always approaching achieved significance, only to 
arrive at further representation. This reversal of the direction of fit that prevails in the 
non-fictional paradigm is the rhetorical reorientation that an awareness of fictionality 
provides for, and that makes it possible to comprehend this distinctive use of narrative 
PHGLD)LFWLYHUKHWRULFH[SORLWVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶VSRZHURIDVVLPLODWLRQPRUHWKDQLWV
modelling of an object: what matters is the respect in which representations are not their 
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objects but uses of a medium, because this is the respect in which they serve human 
needs. The fiction/non-fiction distinction is not fundamentally ontological, but pragmatic: 
not a distinction between referential worlds, but between communicative purposes. 
The Sandman series as a whole offers a wealth of material about dreams, and there is 
perhaps more to be said about the general affinity between the comics medium and dream 
QDUUDWLYHEXW,¶YHFKRVHQWRIRFXVXSRQWKLVSDJHSULPDULO\EHFDXVHLWRIIHUVDSODXVLEOH
fairly literal representation of certain aspects of dreaming in process. Cognitive 
approaches to dreaming are hampered by the inaccessibility of the primary empirical 
GDWDRIFRXUVHDQGWKLVLVQRDQVZHUWRWKDWSUREOHP,¶PQRWSURSRVLQJWRGRDQ\WKLQJ
so tendentious as to treat these fictional representations of dreams as if they were 
instances of actual dreaming. What I want to do, though, is to use some of the issues 
raised by the attempt at representation itself as an occasion to reflect upon certain features 
of dreaming, and to speculate a little upon the relation between dreams and fictions. 
Dreams are situated ambiguously between experience and narrative, and that is bound 
to be exposed by any attempt to represent a dream. The two instances of dream 
representation in figure one respond in different ways, which are manifested in their 
GLIIHULQJVWUDWHJLHVRIQDUUDWLRQDQGIRFDOL]DWLRQ&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPLV narrated in the third 
person, which might deter us from attending to her as dreaming subject, except for the 
strong sense of internal focalization²that is, of an alignment between the third person 
QDUUDWLRQDQG&KDQWDO¶VRZQSHUVSHFWLYH7KLVLVDSSDUHQWin the text of the dream, and in 
WKHIRUPRIWKDWWH[WWKHFXUVLYHVFULSWVXJJHVWLYHRI&KDQWDO¶VRZQKDQGZULWLQJLWLVDOVR
FRQYH\HGE\WKHVHQVHWKDWDV,¶YHDOUHDG\VXJJHVWHGWKHIURQWDOLPDJHVRI&KDQWDODUH
mirror images, and hence that we are seeLQJWKURXJKKHUH\HV7KHVHQVHRI&KDQWDO¶V
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dream that emerges is of a third-person self-narration, in which experience is 
FRQWLQXRXVO\SXVKHGWRDUP¶VOHQJWKSURGXFLQJWKHF\FOLFDOVHOI-eluding self-
FRQVFLRXVQHVVWKDWLVFHQWUDOWR&KDQWDO¶VFKDUDFWHULzation: a little later her dreaming 
becomes an infinite regress in the form of spiralling repeated images with WKHWH[W³,W
ZDVDGDUNDQGVWRUP\QLJKW$QGWKHVNLSSHUVDLGWRWKHPDWHµ0DWHWHOOPHDVWRU\¶
And this is the story he told: It was a darNDQGVWRUP\QLJKW«´-XVWDVWKH
VXEVWDQFHRI&KDQWDO¶VGUHDPLVDQHYDVLRQRIVHOI-knowledge, then, the representation of 
that dream evades the ambiguity between experiencing and narrating even as it 
foregrounds it: the dream Chantal produces and consumes remains trapped in cycles of 
creation and reception, writing and reading. 
=HOGD¶VGUHDPLVGLIIHUHQWLQDQXPEHURIZD\V)LUVWO\WKHWH[WLVILUVW-person 
narration, except in the very last frame. At the same time the visual self-representation is 
HYHQPRUHGLVVRFLDWHGWKDQ&KDQWDO¶VLWLVQRWHYHQDFKLOGKRRGVHOIEXWDFXOWXUDO
archetype of the young girl adrift in a strange world²Alice in Wonderland. There is a 
stronger sense here of a fluid reciprocal relation between the generation of the dream 
QDUUDWLYHDQGWKHGUHDPHU¶VH[SHULHQFHRILWDUHFLSURFLW\FRQYH\HGE\GLVWULEXWLQJLWV
elements between the verbal and visual channels of the representation. The verbal 
narrative is a breathless monologue (the text is compressed so that there are no spaces 
between the words), which at times becomes a kind of meta-discourse, a running 
FRPPHQWDU\XSRQWKHYLVXDODUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHGUHDPQDUUDWLYH³7KDW¶VXV´³/HWLWEH
&KDQWDOQRWP\0RP´³7KDQN\RX*RG´7KHYLVXDOFKDQQHOPHDQZKLOHLVERWK
anticipating and responding to the verbal discourse. The iconography of mother and 
daughter in the second frame conflicts with the commentary identifying this as Chantal 
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DQG=HOGDDQGOHDGVLQWRWKHDQ[LRXVFRQIXVLRQRI&KDQWDOZLWK=HOGD¶VPRWKHUWKDW
followV&RQYHUVHO\WKHYHUEDOQDUUDWLYHRI=HOGD¶V0RPVD\LQJ³2K*RG=HH\RX¶UH
VLFNOLVWHQ5REHUWGR\RXNQRZZKDW,VDZLQKHUURRP\RXUGDXJKWHU¶VGLVJXVWLQJ´LV
then elucidated via the image of an animal skull, the ornate picture frame of which marks 
it aVDIODVKEDFNDQLPDJHRIDGLVWXUEHGIDPLO\KLVWRU\SUHVHUYHGRQ=HOGD¶V
SV\FKRORJLFDOPDQWHOSLHFH7KHSHUVSHFWLYDOIOXLGLW\RI=HOGD¶VGUHDPLVHYHQPRUH
apparent in the last three frames: the veil sequence is the only clear-cut example here of 
first-person experiential perspective, images in which the dream experience and dream 
narration coincide; whereas the detached third-person narration of the final frame 
removes us to a greater distance from the action than at any point previously. This frame 
can RQO\FRQWLQXHWRPDNHVHQVHDV=HOGD¶VRZQGUHDPSHUVSHFWLYHDWWKHFRVWRIDUDGLFDO
dissociation from her own self-representation²that is, a close analogue of the shattered 
PLUURUHIIHFWDWWKHHQGRI&KDQWDO¶VGUHDP 
The problem of person and perspective in the representation of dreams is indicative of 
WKHGUHDP¶VDPELJXRXVVWDWXVEHWZHHQH[SHULHQFHDQGQDUUDWLYH7KHDPELJXLW\LVLQSDUW
a question of the distinction between the dreaming mind and its self-representation within 
the dream²a distinction manifest, for example, in any awareness that you are somehow 
not yourself, as Zelda most obviously is not²but it is also, more broadly, a question of 
consciousness in dreams. The difficulty in locating the self in dreaming is the reason why 
it turns out that the most partial self-representation here is the most direct one: the first-
person experiential perspective of the veil sequence. Conversely, the most rounded 
perspective emerges from the most dissociated representation: the last frame, 
incorporating as iWGRHVWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLYHLGLRV\QFUDV\RI=HOGD¶VDIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHWR
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her own dream. Selfhood is never integral in a semiotic model of cognitive articulation, 
which is both by and for the self. Dreams tend to foreground this internal division, by 
adding to the split between sender and receiver a further split between narrator and agent. 
The broader context of the ambiguity between experience and narrative, concerning 
consciousness in dreams, is a multi-layered issue: consciousness of self is one level of it, 
somewhere mid-way between the irreducible level of consciousness on which you 
experience the dream on the one hand, and on the other hand the more occasional 
consciousness that you are dreaming, or even your conscious manipulations of the course 
of the dream narrative. All these coexist with the unconscious level on which dreams 
W\SLFDOO\IRUPWKHPVHOYHVLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIDQ\FRQVFLRXVFKRLFHRQWKHGUHDPHU¶VSDUW
Conscious choice, however, is consciousness of a choice: it is not coextensive with 
choosing. The sequential character of dream development, which comes out especially 
VWURQJO\LQ=HOGD¶VGUHDPLVDUHVXOWRIDQRQJRLQJSURFHVVRI³VHOI-LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´LQ
dreaming, which can be said to straddle the border of consciousness. Bert States has aptly 
FKDUDFWHULVHGGUHDPLQJDVD³ILUVWGUDIWRIWKRXJKW´LQZKLFKDQLQLWLDOO\UDQGRPFROOLVLRQ
of images prompts the sense-making effort of the dream-work (110). He notes a key 
difference between dream thought and waking processes such as free association or 
GD\GUHDPLQJZKLFKLVWKDW³WKHGUHDPFDQ¶WUHYLVH:KDWFRPHVWRPLQGJRHVVWUDLJKWWR
WKHYLVXDOFRUWH[´7KHVHTXHQWLDOGHYHORSPHQWRIGUHDPLQJFDQEHVHHQDVDQ
effect of this constraint: it is a kind of revision on the fly. 
My speculative thought resolves into the question, are dreams fictions? The answer 
would be trivial if it rested upon their referentiality: of course they are not true. But it 
rests more fundamentally upon the way we understand the mental apparatus of perception 
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to be functioning as a medium in dream cognition. Percepts in general are already 
internal representations, certainly, but they are not innately narrative; the narrativity of 
dreams depends upon the assumed sources of dream material. Is the selection of dream 
material itself a cognitive process, drawing purposively upon episodic and semantic 
memory? Or is the input to dream cognition an effect of other determinants (instinctual 
drives, sensory stimuli, recency effects, random brain activity), in which case the 
cognitive phase of the dream-work is the effort to make sense of this material, which is 
functionally equivalent to sensory data? The ambiguity is between fiction and illusion, or 
narrative and experience. It is clear, however, that whatever blend of these two aspects of 
dreaming applies, dreams cannot be purely illusional. At the higher levels of dream 
cognition, of course, there is an overt self-consciousness informing the creative process 
of the dream-work; but even at the most elemental unconscious level, the dream-work is 
a sequential, recursive process, in which every representation is influenced by the 
cognitive assimilation of the preceding one. Where the dream materials originate 
independently of cognitive processing, they have the status of data, even if not quite the 
external data of waking life; but where they arise out of cognition, they are subject to 
whatever imperative values inform that process (and this need not exclude desiderata of 
the same unconscious origin as some of the first type of dream material). To that extent, 
the dream conforms to the direction-of-fit rhetoric by which I have characterized 
fictionality, its representations generated discursively, out of prior representations, rather 
than referentially, in response to experiential data; and to that extent, it can be understood 
as a, or even as the, proto-fiction. 
Dreams as fictions, the reflexivity of the narrative imagination, the immanence of 
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narrative in its media of articulation (not least at a cognitive level), even the affinity 
between dream narrative and the comics medium: all of these are adumbrated in the 
WKHPDWLFDQGIRUPDOSUHRFFXSDWLRQVRI*DLPDQ¶VSandman series itself. What Sandman 
also triumphantly instanciates, of course, is the richness and resonance of the many 
intertwined stories that traverse, under the eye of the Sandman, the realm of the narrative 
imagination²the Dreaming. 
 
Notes 
1. Compare Genette (30); Prince 1982 (4); Rimmon-Kenan (19); Bal (5); Toolan (14); 
DQG3ULQFHDQGVHH2¶1HLOO-18). 
2. For further discussion of the status of narrative events, as part of a critique of the 
notion of fabula, or story, see Walsh. 
3. 3HLUFH¶VVHQVHRIVHPLRVLVDVSURFHVVZHQWKDQGLQKDQGZLWKDQLGHDRILQWHUQDO
UHIOHFWLRQDVVRFLDO³<RXUVHOIRIRQHLQVWDQWDSSHDls to your deeper self for his 
DVVHQW´ 
4. There is scope for disagreement about who is who in this image: positive identification 
is inhibited by the fact that both Chantal and Zelda are almost always represented as 
veiled, but it is arguable possible to infer from some images that Chantal is slightly 
taller than Zelda, which would count against my interpretation here. 
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